🔥 FRESH CORPORATE CREDENTIALS - TECH STARTUP 🔥
Posted by: ShadowBroker_FR
Price: 15,000€ BTC

- Company: FlowTech SaaS (France, 35 employees)
- M365 Global Admin accounts: 12 confirmed
- Database: 347 client accounts with payment data
- Source: Internal (verified insider)
- Proof: [screenshot of M365 admin panel]

Sample data available for serious buyers.
PM for details. Escrow accepted.

// Sample extrait des données volées
{
  "company": "FlowTech",
  "admin_accounts": [
    {
      "email": "julien.martin@flowtech.com",
      "role": "Global Administrator",
      "last_login": "2025-01-08T14:23:00Z",
      "mfa_enabled": false
    },
    {
      "email": "kevin.dubois@flowtech.com", 
      "role": "Global Administrator",
      "last_login": "2025-01-08T16:45:00Z",
      "mfa_enabled": false
    },
    // ... 10 autres comptes admin
  ],
  "client_data_sample": [
    {
      "client_email": "marie.dupont@acmecorp.fr",
      "payment_method": "****1234 Visa",
      "subscription": "Premium - 450€/mois",
      "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."
    }
    // ... données de 347 clients
  ]
}

# Script d'audit emergency - Noirpen
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Directory.Read.All","AuditLog.Read.All"

# 1. Liste des Global Administrators
Write-Host "=== AUDIT GLOBAL ADMINISTRATORS ===" -ForegroundColor Red
$globalAdmins = Get-MgDirectoryRole -Filter "displayName eq 'Global Administrator'" | 
    Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember
$globalAdmins | Format-Table DisplayName, UserPrincipalName, UserType

# 2. Activités suspectes récentes  
Write-Host "=== ACTIVITÉS SUSPECTES (30 derniers jours) ===" -ForegroundColor Red
$suspiciousActivities = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-30) -EndDate (Get-Date) -Operations "Add member to group","Remove member from group","Update user","UserLoginFailed" -ResultSize 2000

# 3. Exports de données massifs
Write-Host "=== EXPORTS MASSIFS DÉTECTÉS ===" -ForegroundColor Red
$dataExports = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-30) -Operations "SearchExportDownloaded","MailItemsAccessed" -ResultSize 1000

$dataExports | Where-Object {$_.ResultCount -gt 100} | 
    Select-Object CreationDate, UserIds, Operation, ResultCount | 
    Sort-Object ResultCount -Descending

=== AUDIT GLOBAL ADMINISTRATORS ===
DisplayName          UserPrincipalName              UserType
-----------          -----------------              --------
Julien Martin        julien.martin@flowtech.com    Member
Kevin Dubois         kevin.dubois@flowtech.com     Member  
Sarah Chen           sarah.chen@flowtech.com       Member
Thomas Petit         thomas.petit@flowtech.com     Member
Marie Rousseau       marie.rousseau@flowtech.com   Member
[... 7 autres comptes]

=== EXPORTS MASSIFS DÉTECTÉS ===
CreationDate         UserIds                    Operation                ResultCount
------------         -------                    ---------                -----------
2025-01-05 22:34:12  thomas.petit@flowtech.com SearchExportDownloaded   2,847
2025-01-03 19:23:45  kevin.dubois@flowtech.com MailItemsAccessed        1,456
2025-01-02 23:12:30  sarah.chen@flowtech.com   SearchExportDownloaded     892
2025-01-01 02:45:18  thomas.petit@flowtech.com SearchExportDownloaded   3,234

# Analyse des connexions Thomas Petit
$thomasActivities = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -UserIds "thomas.petit@flowtech.com" -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-30) -EndDate (Get-Date) -ResultSize 2000

# Analyse des IP sources
$ipAnalysis = $thomasActivities | Select-Object CreationDate, ClientIP, Operation, ResultCount
$ipAnalysis | Group-Object ClientIP | Sort-Object Count -Descending

# Résultat
ClientIP        Count   Localisation
--------        -----   ------------
192.168.1.45    234     Bureau FlowTech (normal)
176.123.45.67    89     Domicile Thomas (normal)
185.220.102.8    45     Tor Exit Node (SUSPECT !)
94.142.241.35    23     VPN Commercial (SUSPECT !)

# Timeline de la trahison de Thomas
Date: 2024-12-15
Action: Contact initial sur Telegram par un broker de données
Message: "Salut, tu bosses chez FlowTech ? On paye bien pour des données B2B..."

Date: 2024-12-20  
Action: Première transaction test
Données: Liste des 35 employés + organigramme
Prix: 1,500€ BTC

Date: 2024-12-28
Action: Transaction principale
Données: 12 comptes Global Admin + 347 clients complets
Prix: 15,000€ BTC
Justification mentale: "C'est juste de la data, personne ne sera blessé"

Date: 2025-01-01 à 2025-01-05
Action: Exports complémentaires
Données: Tokens API, configurations, backups
Prix: 8,500€ BTC supplémentaires
Méthode: Connexions via Tor pour éviter la détection

# FLOWTECH - RAPPORT D'INCIDENT MAJEUR
Incident_Type: "Insider Threat - Malicious Insider"
Duration: "45 days (Dec 15, 2024 - Jan 30, 2025)"
Insider: "Thomas Petit - Contrôleur de gestion"
Access_Level: "Global Administrator M365"

Données_Compromises:
  Comptes_Admin: 12
  Clients_Compromis: 347
  Données_Financières: "100% - Cartes de crédit, virements, facturation"
  API_Tokens: "23 tokens valides exfiltrés"  
  Configurations_Infra: "Complètes - AWS, Azure, M365"
  Backups_Accès: "Oui - 3 backups complets téléchargés"

Impact_Financier:
  Revenus_Perdus: "156,000€ - Clients partis après notification"
  Amendes_RGPD: "67,000€ - Sanction CNIL déjà notifiée"
  Forensique_Legal: "45,000€ - Investigation + avocat"
  Système_Sécurité: "89,000€ - Refonte complète"
  Communication_Crise: "23,000€"
  TOTAL_IMPACT: "380,000€"

Chiffre_Affaires_Annuel: "890,000€"
Impact_Pourcentage: "42.7% du CA annuel"

# FlowTech Security Framework v2.0
# "Trust No One, Verify Everything"

Privilege_Management:
  Principe: "Minimum Viable Admin Rights"
  Global_Admin: 
    - count: 2 (CEO + CTO only)
    - mfa: "Hardware tokens obligatoires"  
    - monitoring: "24/7 SIEM alerting"
    - sessions: "Max 4h, re-auth required"
    
  Role_Based_Access:
    - developer: "Application.ReadWrite.OwnedBy only"
    - marketing: "Mail.ReadWrite + Calendar.ReadWrite"
    - finance: "Reports.Read + Billing.ReadWrite"
    - support: "User.ReadBasic.All"
    
Data_Loss_Prevention:
  Export_Monitoring:
    - threshold: "> 50 records = alert"
    - forbidden_hours: "22h-6h = blocked"
    - ip_restrictions: "Office + Home only"
    - tor_detection: "Automatic block + incident"
    
  Behavioral_Analytics:
    - baseline: "30 days learning period"
    - anomalies: "Real-time scoring"
    - risk_threshold: "> 75% = lock account"
    
Dark_Web_Monitoring:
  Service: "Flare.io Enterprise"
  Keywords: ["FlowTech", "flowtech.com", domain variations]
  Frequency: "Real-time alerts"
  Response: "< 30 minutes incident activation"

# FlowTech Recovery Metrics (1 year post-incident)

Security_Improvements:
  Global_Admin_Count: 12 → 2 (-83%)
  MFA_Coverage: 34% → 100% (+66%)
  Privileged_Access_Monitoring: 0% → 100%
  Dark_Web_Mentions: "Monthly alerts for early warning"
  
Business_Recovery:
  Client_Base: 258 → 389 (+51% vs. pre-incident)
  Revenue: 890k€ → 1.2M€ (+35%)
  Trust_Score: 2.1/5 → 4.3/5 (+105%)
  Press_Mentions: "From scandal to security example"
  
Investment_Results:
  Series_A: "Secured 2.5M€ - cybersecurity as competitive advantage"
  Valuation: "Security framework valued at 30% of company"

# Framework de gouvernance FlowTech v2.0
# By Noirpen - RSSI

# 1. Audit mensuel automatisé des privilèges
function Invoke-PrivilegeAudit {
    $report = @()
    
    # Global Admins (MAX 2 autorisés)
    $globalAdmins = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId (Get-MgDirectoryRole -Filter "displayName eq 'Global Administrator'").Id
    if ($globalAdmins.Count -gt 2) {
        $report += "❌ ALERT: $($globalAdmins.Count) Global Admins detected (MAX: 2)"
    }
    
    # Comptes sans MFA (ZERO TOLERANCE)
    $noMfaUsers = Get-MgUser -Filter "assignedLicenses/`$count ne 0 and signInActivity/lastSignInDateTime ge $((Get-Date).AddDays(-30).ToString('yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ssZ'))" -ConsistencyLevel eventual -CountVariable CountVar -All | Where-Object {(Get-MgUserAuthenticationMethod -UserId $_.Id).Count -eq 0}
    if ($noMfaUsers) {
        $report += "❌ CRITICAL: $($noMfaUsers.Count) admin accounts without MFA"
    }
    
    return $report
}

# 2. Détection d'exports suspects (Thomas Pattern)
function Search-SuspiciousExports {
    param([int]$ThresholdItems = 100)
    
    $suspiciousExports = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -Operations "SearchExportDownloaded","MailItemsAccessed" -ResultSize 2000 | 
        Where-Object {$_.ResultCount -gt $ThresholdItems -or $_.CreationDate.Hour -lt 6 -or $_.CreationDate.Hour -gt 22}
    
    foreach ($export in $suspiciousExports) {
        Send-AlertEmail -Subject "INSIDER THREAT ALERT" -Body "User $($export.UserIds) exported $($export.ResultCount) items at $($export.CreationDate)"
    }
}

# 3. Monitoring connexions Tor/VPN
function Monitor-SuspiciousConnections {
    $torExitNodes = Invoke-RestMethod "https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses" | Select-String "ExitAddress" | ForEach-Object {($_ -split " ")[1]}
    
    $recentSignIns = Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Top 1000
    $suspiciousSignIns = $recentSignIns | Where-Object {$_.IpAddress -in $torExitNodes -or $_.DeviceDetail.TrustType -eq "Unknown"}
    
    foreach ($signin in $suspiciousSignIns) {
        Write-Warning "⚠️ SUSPICIOUS LOGIN: $($signin.UserDisplayName) from $($signin.IpAddress)"
    }
}

# Exécution quotidienne
Invoke-PrivilegeAudit
Search-SuspiciousExports -ThresholdItems 50
Monitor-SuspiciousConnections