What if... an intern had access to everything - S01E04?

An investigation into the dangers of poorly managed administrative privileges in the cybersecurity era.

blog s01e04-et-si-un-stagiaire-avait-acces-a-tout Mon Sep 30 2024 02:00:00 GMT+0200 (heure d’été d’Europe centrale) en Etsi securityespionage

What if... an intern had access to everything - S01E04?

An investigation into the dangers of poorly managed administrative privileges in the cybersecurity era.

Mon Sep 30 2024
3576 words · 26 minutes

What if… an intern had access to everything?

Introduction: The scourge of privileges through negligence

Marcus Fontaine, CIO of TechnoServ SA for eight years, thought he had seen everything when it came to security incidents. Ransomware, sophisticated phishing, denial of service attacks… His team had survived it all. But this Tuesday morning in September 2024, discovering routine audit logs, Marcus realizes he is facing a threat he had never really taken seriously: a 20-year-old intern who has had, for three weeks, administrator privileges on the entire critical infrastructure of the company.

This story is neither exceptional nor fictional. In 2024, 71% of organizations are moderately to highly vulnerable to insider threats according to the Cybersecurity Insiders report. Even more troubling: 51% suffered at least six incidents related to privileged access during the year, with an average cost of $676,517 per incident - a 34% increase compared to 2023.

For CIOs and CISOs, the question is no longer whether their onboarding processes are flawed, but to what extent this flaw can destroy their organization. Because in the universe of modern cybersecurity, a poorly configured intern can cause more damage than an army of professional hackers.

Chapter 1: The Discovery - When audit reveals the unthinkable

1.1 Marcus faces the evidence

09:15, Marcus’s office, TechnoServ SA

Marcus jumps when he sees the automated audit report appear on his screen. Since implementing their PAM solution six months earlier, these weekly reports have become his morning routine. But this week, something is wrong.

BASH
=== PRIVILEGE AUDITABILITY REPORT - WEEK 37/2024 ===

ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNTS DETECTED: 127 (+1)
- Service accounts: 45
- Permanent administrators: 23  
- Temporary administrators: 59 (+1)

CRITICAL ALERT: New admin account detected
- User ID: jdupont.stagiaire
- Privilege level: Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin, Schema Admin
- Creation date: 02/09/2024
- Last connection: 23/09/2024 - 23:47
- Accessible systems: ALL (178 servers)
- Databases: ALL (23 instances)
- Business applications: ALL (67 applications)

SUSPICIOUS NIGHT ACTIVITY DETECTED:
- 156 connections between 22:00 and 06:00 for 15 days
- 2.3 TB of data accessed
- 47 client databases consulted
- 12 backup servers accessed

Marcus rereads the report three times before reality sets in: Julien Dupont, the cybersecurity intern who arrived three weeks ago, has complete privileged access to the infrastructure. Worse still: he’s using it, at night, when no one is there to monitor.

1.2 The immediate investigation

POWERSHELL
# Privilege investigation script - Analysis of jdupont.stagiaire account
# INTERNAL SECURITY USE - Marcus Fontaine, CIO

# Checking group memberships
Get-ADUser jdupont.stagiaire -Properties MemberOf | 
    Select-Object -ExpandProperty MemberOf | 
    Get-ADGroup | Select-Object Name, Description

# Terrifying results:
# Domain Admins - Full domain access
# Enterprise Admins - Complete forest access  
# Schema Admins - AD schema modification
# Backup Operators - Backup access
# Server Operators - Server management
# Account Operators - Account creation/deletion

# Audit of recent connections
Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4624 | 
    Where-Object {$_.ReplacementStrings[5] -eq "jdupont.stagiaire"} |
    Select-Object TimeGenerated, MachineName, @{Name="LoginType";Expression={$_.ReplacementStrings[8]}}

# Analysis of sensitive data access
Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4663 |
    Where-Object {$_.ReplacementStrings[1] -eq "jdupont.stagiaire"} |
    Group-Object {$_.ReplacementStrings[6]} | 
    Sort-Object Count -Descending

The results confirm his worst fears. In three weeks, Julien has:

  • Accessed 67 different business applications
  • Consulted 23 client databases
  • Downloaded 2.3 TB of data
  • Created 12 undocumented user accounts
  • Modified backup policies on 8 critical servers

1.3 The suspicious pattern

“An intern who works until 2 AM? Either he’s exceptionally motivated, or…”

Marcus examines the detailed logs and discovers a troubling pattern:

Legitimate activities (9 AM-6 PM):

  • Technical documentation consultations
  • Tests on development environments
  • Participation in team meetings
  • Standard security training

Night activities (10 PM-6 AM):

  • Massive client database extraction (1.2 TB)
  • Critical server configuration copying
  • Active Directory policy exports
  • Password vault access
  • Navigation to external cloud storage sites

🔍 Real case: Mercedes-Benz GitHub Token (January 2024)

  • Context: Unrestricted GitHub token exposed publicly
  • Impact: Source code, cloud credentials, and sensitive infrastructure data exposed
  • Cause: Human error by a temporary developer
  • Lesson: Poorly managed temporary access represents a critical risk
  • Source: RedHunt Labs Security Research 2024

Chapter 2: Escalation - From suspicion to certainty

2.1 The silent confrontation

Marcus decides to discreetly approach Julien before alerting management. At 2:30 PM, he knocks on the door of the open space where the interns work.

“Julien? Do you have five minutes? I’d like to review your integration.”

The young man, 20 years old, glasses, hooded sweater, looks up from his screen with an innocent smile.

“Of course, Marcus! I’m really happy to be here. I’m learning a lot.”

“Perfect. Tell me, do you often work late? I saw you were connected very late last night…”

A micro-silence. An imperceptible twitch of the eyelids.

“Oh that? I’m a bit of an insomniac, so sometimes I connect from home to review the documentation. I hope that’s not a problem?”

“No, no, on the contrary, it’s good to see your motivation. By the way, do you need access to all these systems for your tasks?”

“Uh… which ones? I just use what Christophe gave me when I arrived.”

Christophe. The IT manager who handled Julien’s arrival and who is… on leave for a week. Marcus begins to understand.

2.2 The thorough investigation

PYTHON
# Forensic analysis script of jdupont.stagiaire activities
# Claudius Security Analytics - Marcus Fontaine

import pandas as pd
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

class InsiderThreatAnalysis:
    def __init__(self, user_id):
        self.user_id = user_id
        self.suspicious_activities = []
        
    def analyze_data_access_patterns(self, access_logs):
        """Analysis of data access patterns"""
        
        # Grouping by access hour
        hourly_access = access_logs.groupby(
            access_logs['timestamp'].dt.hour
        ).size()
        
        # Abnormal activity detection (10 PM-6 AM)
        night_activity = hourly_access[22:24].sum() + hourly_access[0:6].sum()
        day_activity = hourly_access[6:22].sum()
        
        if night_activity > day_activity * 0.3:  # More than 30% night activity
            self.suspicious_activities.append({
                'type': 'unusual_hours',
                'severity': 'HIGH',
                'details': f'Night activity: {night_activity}, Day: {day_activity}'
            })
    
    def detect_bulk_data_extraction(self, data_transfer_logs):
        """Detection of massive data extraction"""
        
        daily_transfers = data_transfer_logs.groupby(
            data_transfer_logs['timestamp'].dt.date
        )['size_mb'].sum()
        
        # Critical threshold: more than 100GB per day
        critical_days = daily_transfers[daily_transfers > 100 * 1024]
        
        if len(critical_days) > 0:
            self.suspicious_activities.append({
                'type': 'bulk_extraction',
                'severity': 'CRITICAL',
                'details': f'Large transfers on {len(critical_days)} days'
            })
    
    def check_privilege_usage(self, privilege_logs):
        """Privilege usage verification"""
        
        admin_actions = privilege_logs[
            privilege_logs['action_type'].isin([
                'user_creation', 'policy_modification', 
                'backup_access', 'schema_change'
            ])
        ]
        
        if len(admin_actions) > 50:  # Arbitrary threshold
            self.suspicious_activities.append({
                'type': 'excessive_admin_usage',
                'severity': 'HIGH', 
                'details': f'{len(admin_actions)} admin actions detected'
            })

# Analysis for jdupont.stagiaire
analyzer = InsiderThreatAnalysis("jdupont.stagiaire")

# Automated analysis results:
# - 78% activity between 10 PM and 6 AM
# - 2.3 TB transferred in 15 days (average 157 GB/day)
# - 127 privileged administration actions
# - Access to 23 different client databases
# - Creation of 12 unauthorized accounts

2.3 The discovery of blackmail

Digging deeper, Marcus discovers the smoking gun in the application logs. Julien didn’t just consult the data: he methodically exported and organized it.

Structure of extracted data:

PLAINTEXT
/exports_julien/
├── clients_premium/
│   ├── fortunes_500_contacts.xlsx (234 MB)
│   ├── government_contracts.pdf (156 MB)
│   └── commercial_strategies_2024.docx (45 MB)
├── technical_data/
│   ├── complete_architecture_schemas.json (789 MB)
│   ├── service_passwords.txt (2 MB)
│   └── prod_server_configurations.zip (1.2 GB)
└── human_resources/
    ├── management_salaries.xlsx (12 MB)
    ├── confidential_evaluations.pdf (234 MB)
    └── restructuring_strategies.docx (67 MB)

But the most disturbing comes in the email Marcus discovers in the gateway logs:

From: jdupont.stagiaire@technoserv.com
To: j.dupont.perso@protonmail.com
Subject: Package ready for discussion
Date: 23/09/2024 23:47

“Hi, The collection is now complete. 2.3TB of premium content as discussed.
Ready for next phase. Awaiting final instructions and payment confirmation. Best regards”

Marcus realizes with horror that Julien is probably not acting alone. They are facing an organized industrial espionage operation.

🔍 Real case: Insider Threats Statistics 2024

  • Average cost per incident: $676,517 (+34% vs 2023)
  • Organizations affected: 71% report being vulnerable
  • Multiple incidents: 51% suffer 6+ attacks per year
  • Global financial impact: $8.8 million per organization
  • Source: 2024 Insider Threat Report, Cybersecurity Insiders

Chapter 3: The response - Investigation, containment and remediation

3.1 The crisis cell

Marcus immediately convenes a crisis meeting with:

  • Sophie Chen, CISO
  • David Moreau, Legal Manager
  • Isabelle Varga, HR Director
  • Thomas Lemaire, Infrastructure Manager

4:30 PM, secure crisis room

“The analysis is conclusive,” announces Marcus. “Julien Dupont has had complete administrator privileges on our infrastructure for three weeks. He has exfiltrated 2.3 terabytes of sensitive data and appears to be acting on behalf of a third party.”

Sophie, the CISO, pales: “How can an intern have Domain Admin rights?”

“Onboarding error. Christophe apparently copy-pasted the privileges of a senior administrator instead of applying the intern template.”

3.2 Immediate action plan

Phase 1: Containment (Immediate - 2h)

POWERSHELL
# Emergency revocation script
# EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY - Marcus Fontaine

# 1. User account deactivation
Disable-ADAccount -Identity jdupont.stagiaire

# 2. Active sessions revocation  
Get-ADComputer -Filter * | ForEach-Object {
    Invoke-Command -ComputerName $_.Name -ScriptBlock {
        Get-Process -IncludeUserName | Where-Object {$_.UserName -eq "TECHNOSERV\jdupont.stagiaire"} | Stop-Process -Force
    } -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}

# 3. Network blocking by MAC address
$MacAddress = "00:1B:44:11:3A:B7"  # Julien's laptop MAC
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block Julien Device" dir=in action=block remoteip=any

# 4. Certificate and token invalidation
Revoke-AzAccessToken -TenantId "technoserv-tenant-id"

Phase 2: Forensic investigation (2-48h)

BASH
#!/bin/bash
# Forensic collection script - Julien Dupont Incident
# Claudius Incident Response Team

echo "=== INSIDER THREAT FORENSIC COLLECTION ==="

# Log preservation before rotation
mkdir -p /forensics/julien_dupont_incident/
cp -r /var/log/security/* /forensics/julien_dupont_incident/logs/
cp -r /var/log/audit/* /forensics/julien_dupont_incident/audit/

# Network activity extraction
tcpdump -r /var/log/network.pcap host 192.168.1.45 > /forensics/julien_dupont_incident/network_activity.txt

# Database access analysis  
mysql -e "SELECT user,host,command_type,db,time FROM mysql.general_log WHERE user LIKE '%jdupont%' AND time >= '2024-09-02';" > /forensics/julien_dupont_incident/db_access.sql

# Timeline reconstruction
python3 << EOF
import json
from datetime import datetime

# Complete chronological reconstruction
events = []

# Log fusion: AD, applications, network, databases
with open('/forensics/julien_dupont_incident/timeline.json', 'w') as f:
    json.dump(events, f, indent=2)
    
print("Forensic timeline generated")
EOF

Phase 3: Damage assessment (24-72h)

The assessment reveals the catastrophic scope:

💥 NEXA-DIGITAL catastrophe report - Click to see the extent of damage
👥 Clients: 234,000 complete files compromised

Data exposed by Lea:

  • Names, addresses, phone numbers of all clients
  • 5-year purchase histories
  • Preferences and behavioral data
  • Bank details of 89,000 clients

Immediate business impact:

  • GDPR notification within 72h (mandatory)
  • GDPR fine risk: 4% of revenue = €2.8M
  • Estimated client confidence loss: 40%
  • Probable class action: €500k-1.2M

Client consequence: 67% changed providers within 6 months

🏗️ Technical: Complete architecture exposed

What Lea downloaded:

  • Complete architecture diagrams
  • Server and security configurations
  • Critical application source codes
  • Documentation of known vulnerabilities

Security impact:

  • Attacker roadmap facilitated
  • Exposed vulnerabilities = easy targets
  • Intellectual property disclosed
  • Competitor development time reduced by 18 months

Re-development cost: €3.2M over 2 years

💼 Commercial: 2024-2025 strategies revealed

Stolen strategic plans:

  • 18-month product roadmap
  • Pricing strategies and margins
  • Prospect lists with scoring
  • Confidential partnership agreements

Competitor advantages:

  • 12 tenders lost in 6 months
  • Strategies copied by 3 competitors
  • Partnership negotiations compromised
  • Weakened market position

Estimated revenue loss: €8.5M over 2024-2025

👤 HR: Salaries, evaluations disclosed

Compromised HR data:

  • Complete salary grids (234 employees)
  • Individual evaluations 2022-2023
  • Career plans and training
  • Confidential disciplinary files

Social climate impact:

  • Salary tensions publicly revealed
  • 23 key employees resigned
  • Widespread motivation loss
  • Complicated union negotiations

Additional HR cost: Recruitment, training, raises = €1.1M

💰 Financial: Budgets and margins exposed

Disclosed financial intelligence:

  • Detailed budgets by BU
  • Margins by client and project
  • Growth forecasts 2024-2026
  • Real operational costs

Competitive intelligence:

  • Price war triggered
  • Margins compressed by 15%
  • Unbalanced client negotiations
  • Fundraising postponed

Valuation impact: -30% on company valuation = -€21M

🔥 TOTAL CATASTROPHE: €37.4M

Cost breakdown:

  • Fines/legal: €4.2M
  • Revenue loss: €8.5M
  • Re-development: €3.2M
  • HR costs: €1.1M
  • Valuation impact: €21M

Estimated recovery time: 3-4 years minimum

The lesson: 1 poorly supervised intern = potential financial disaster

Total estimated cost: 2.3 million euros

Criminal complaint: Computer data theft, industrial espionage, breach of trust

Internal communication: CEO message to all employees on enhanced security

GDPR notification: Massive personal data breach (72 hours legal)

Client communication: Personalized notification to 234,000 affected clients

Chapter 4: Preventive solutions - Secure privilege architecture

4.1 Principle of least privilege (POLP)

Rigorous POLP implementation:

YAML
# Access template by profile - TechnoServ SA v2.0
access_profiles:
  intern:
    duration: "temporary_max_6_months"  
    privileges:
      - read_access: ["dev_environment", "documentation", "training_resources"]
      - write_access: ["personal_workspace", "test_databases_limited"]
      - admin_access: []  # NEVER admin access
    prohibited:
      - production_systems
      - client_databases  
      - backup_systems
      - schema_modifications
    monitoring: "enhanced_24x7"
    
  junior_employee:
    duration: "permanent"
    privileges:
      - read_access: ["dev_environment", "staging_environment", "project_docs"]
      - write_access: ["assigned_projects", "dev_databases"] 
      - admin_access: ["dev_servers_assigned"]
    prohibited:
      - production_admin
      - client_data_full
      - backup_admin
    monitoring: "standard"
    
  senior_admin:
    duration: "permanent"
    privileges:
      - read_access: ["all_environments"]  
      - write_access: ["all_non_prod"]
      - admin_access: ["infrastructure", "user_management"]
    additional_controls:
      - mfa_required: true
      - approval_workflow: true
      - session_recording: true  
      - just_in_time_access: true
    monitoring: "maximum"

4.2 Modern PAM architecture

🛠️ Recommended 2024 technology stack

🔧 Anti-Lea arsenal - Solutions to avoid catastrophe
🏦 PAM Core - CyberArk PAS (Cost: €€€€, ROI: 2 years)

Function: Vault for all privileged access What would have stopped Lea:

  • No direct database access
  • Mandatory credential checkout/checkin
  • Complete session recording
  • Workflow approval for sensitive access

Startup configuration:

  • 50-200 managed privileged accounts
  • Annual budget: €80-120k
  • Implementation time: 4-6 months
  • Calculated ROI: 1 incident avoided = solution paid over 2 years
⚡ JIT Access - Microsoft PIM (Cost: €€€, ROI: 1.5 years)

Function: Just-in-time access with privilege elevation Anti-intern principle:

  • No permanent rights = no permanent risk
  • Mandatory request + justification + approval
  • Limited duration (2-8h max)
  • Automatic notification to managers

Lea blocked case:

  • “Prod access for training” request → Automatically rejected
  • 11 PM attempt → Immediate escalation to CISO
  • Budget: Included in Microsoft E5 licenses = Almost free
🕵️ Monitoring - Splunk UEBA (Cost: €€€€, ROI: 1.8 years)

Function: User behavior analytics Alerts that would have sounded for Lea:

  • 47GB download in 3 weeks (vs 200MB usual)
  • Access to 23 different databases (vs 2 usual)
  • Atypical hours: 10 PM-2 AM (outside intern profile)
  • Inconsistent geolocation (personal VPN)

Intern detection configuration:

  • “Intern” profile with strict thresholds
  • Machine learning on legitimate behaviors
  • Real-time alert: Email + SMS + Slack = 2 minutes max
🆔 Identity - Okta Universal Directory (Cost: €€€, ROI: 1.2 years)

Function: Centralized identity and access management Missing controls at NEXA:

  • Automatic provisioning/deprovisioning
  • Dynamic groups according to actual function
  • Mandatory quarterly access review
  • HR integration for internship = limited rights

Golden rule for interns:

  • Default access = NOTHING
  • Each granted right = written justification
  • Duration = exact internship duration
  • Cost per user: €8/month vs €37M catastrophe avoided
🚨 SIEM - Sentinel + Logic Apps (Cost: €€€, ROI: 1.5 years)

Function: Automatic orchestration of incident response Anti-exfiltration playbook:

  1. Detection: Abnormal download volume
  2. Immediate action: Account blocking + network isolation
  3. Investigation: Automatic forensic capture
  4. Notification: CISO + DPO + Management alert

Reaction in Lea case:

  • Minute 0: Alert triggered (download > 5GB)
  • Minute 2: Account automatically blocked
  • Minute 5: Workstation isolation
  • Minute 10: CISO alerted with complete details

Cloud budget: €15-25k/year vs €37M saved = 1,480,000% ROI 🚀

Secure access workflow:

graph TD A[Privileged access request] --> B{User profile?} B -->|Intern| C[Automatic refusal + CISO alert] B -->|Employee| D[Automatic needs assessment] B -->|Admin| E[Manager approval workflow] D --> F{Justified access?} F -->|No| G[Refusal with recommendations] F -->|Yes| H[Temporary access granted] E --> I[Double approval required] I --> J[JIT access with session recording] H --> K[Behavioral monitoring activated] J --> K K --> L[Automatic revocation end session]

4.3 Secure onboarding process

Zero Trust integration framework:

BASH
#!/bin/bash
# Secure onboarding script v3.0 - TechnoServ SA
# Author: Marcus Fontaine, CIO
# Validation: Sophie Chen, CISO

create_secure_user_account() {
    local username=$1
    local user_type=$2  # intern|employee|admin
    local duration=$3   # days
    
    echo "=== SECURE ONBOARDING - $username ==="
    
    # 1. Preliminary verification
    if [[ "$user_type" == "intern" && "$duration" -gt 180 ]]; then
        echo "ERROR: Max intern duration = 180 days"
        exit 1
    fi
    
    # 2. Account creation with appropriate profile
    case $user_type in
        "intern")
            create_account_with_profile "$username" "intern_template"
            setup_enhanced_monitoring "$username"
            setup_data_loss_prevention "$username"
            ;;
        "employee") 
            create_account_with_profile "$username" "employee_template"
            setup_standard_monitoring "$username"
            ;;
        "admin")
            echo "ADMIN CREATION REQUIRES MANUAL APPROVAL"
            create_approval_request "$username" "admin_creation"
            exit 0
            ;;
    esac
    
    # 3. Automatic expiration configuration
    setup_account_expiry "$username" "$duration"
    
    # 4. Security teams notification
    notify_security_team "$username" "$user_type" "$duration"
    
    # 5. Traceable documentation
    log_account_creation "$username" "$user_type" "$duration"
}

setup_enhanced_monitoring() {
    local username=$1
    
    # 24/7 surveillance for interns
    cat >> /etc/security/watched_accounts.conf << EOF
$username:
  monitor_level: MAXIMUM
  alert_thresholds:
    failed_logins: 3
    off_hours_access: ANY
    data_transfer_mb: 100
    admin_attempts: 1
  real_time_alerts: true
  session_recording: true
EOF
}

Secure onboarding checklist:

Pre-arrival phase (D-7):

  • Candidate security profile validation
  • Strict access perimeter definition according to position
  • Isolated training environment preparation
  • Behavioral monitoring configuration

First day (D+0):

  • Mandatory security training (4h minimum)
  • Personalized IT charter signature
  • Account creation with appropriate template ONLY
  • Limited access testing with supervision

Weekly follow-up:

  • Access logs and activities review
  • Direct manager needs validation
  • Privilege adjustment if justified
  • Continuous best practices training

4.4 Advanced behavioral detection

Anomaly detection algorithms:

PYTHON
# Insider threat detection system - TechnoServ SA
# Machine learning behavioral analysis

import numpy as np
from sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest
from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler
import pandas as pd

class InsiderThreatDetection:
    def __init__(self):
        self.model = IsolationForest(contamination=0.1, random_state=42)
        self.scaler = StandardScaler()
        self.baseline_established = False
        
    def extract_behavioral_features(self, user_logs):
        """Behavioral characteristics extraction"""
        features = {
            # Temporal patterns
            'avg_login_hour': user_logs['login_time'].dt.hour.mean(),
            'night_activity_ratio': len(user_logs[(user_logs['login_time'].dt.hour >= 22) | 
                                                (user_logs['login_time'].dt.hour <= 6)]) / len(user_logs),
            'weekend_activity_ratio': len(user_logs[user_logs['login_time'].dt.weekday >= 5]) / len(user_logs),
            
            # Access patterns
            'unique_systems_accessed': user_logs['system'].nunique(),
            'avg_session_duration': user_logs['session_duration'].mean(),
            'failed_access_attempts': len(user_logs[user_logs['status'] == 'failed']),
            
            # Data patterns
            'total_data_transferred_mb': user_logs['data_transferred_mb'].sum(),
            'avg_daily_transfer': user_logs.groupby(user_logs['login_time'].dt.date)['data_transferred_mb'].sum().mean(),
            'max_single_transfer': user_logs['data_transferred_mb'].max(),
            
            # Privilege patterns
            'admin_actions_count': len(user_logs[user_logs['privilege_level'] == 'admin']),
            'privilege_escalation_attempts': len(user_logs[user_logs['action'].str.contains('elevate|sudo|runas', case=False, na=False)]),
        }
        
        return pd.DataFrame([features])
    
    def train_baseline(self, historical_data):
        """Behavioral baseline establishment"""
        features_matrix = []
        
        for user_id in historical_data['user_id'].unique():
            user_data = historical_data[historical_data['user_id'] == user_id]
            if len(user_data) >= 10:  # Minimum observations
                features = self.extract_behavioral_features(user_data)
                features_matrix.append(features.values[0])
        
        X = np.array(features_matrix)
        X_scaled = self.scaler.fit_transform(X)
        self.model.fit(X_scaled)
        self.baseline_established = True
        
    def detect_anomaly(self, user_logs, user_id):
        """Anomaly detection for a user"""
        if not self.baseline_established:
            return {'error': 'Baseline not established'}
            
        features = self.extract_behavioral_features(user_logs)
        X_scaled = self.scaler.transform(features.values)
        
        anomaly_score = self.model.decision_function(X_scaled)[0]
        is_anomaly = self.model.predict(X_scaled)[0] == -1
        
        # Risk score calculation (0-100)
        risk_score = max(0, min(100, (0.5 - anomaly_score) * 100))
        
        return {
            'user_id': user_id,
            'is_anomaly': is_anomaly,
            'risk_score': risk_score,
            'anomaly_score': anomaly_score,
            'behavioral_features': features.to_dict('records')[0]
        }

# Real-time monitoring integration
detector = InsiderThreatDetection()

# Automatic alert if risk_score > 75 for interns
def alert_if_high_risk(user_id, risk_score):
    if risk_score > 75:
        send_security_alert({
            'severity': 'HIGH',
            'user': user_id, 
            'risk_score': risk_score,
            'timestamp': datetime.now(),
            'action_required': 'IMMEDIATE_REVIEW'
        })

Continuous monitoring metrics:

IndicatorNormal ThresholdAlert ThresholdCritical Threshold
Night activity< 5%5-20%> 20%
Data transfer/day< 500 MB500MB-5GB> 5 GB
Unique systems accessed< 1010-50> 50
Admin attempts01-3> 3
Login failures< 2/day2-10/day> 10/day

Chapter 5: The troubling epilogue - What if it wasn’t an accident?

5.1 The investigation revelations

Three weeks after the incident, the computer police investigation reveals disturbing elements. Julien Dupont was not an ordinary intern looking for extra income.

Real profile discovered:

  • Cybersecurity engineer degree obtained 6 months earlier
  • Technical skills far superior to his CV
  • Dark web connections for 2 years under pseudonym “DataHarvester”
  • 3 other internships in competing companies over the last 18 months
  • Bank accounts funded by undeclared crypto transfers

The investigation especially reveals that Christophe, the IT manager who granted him privileges, received 15,000 euros in Bitcoin three days before Julien’s arrival. The two men had known each other for several months via technical forums.

5.2 The coordinated operation

PLAINTEXT
TIMELINE RECONSTRUCTION - OPERATION "HARVEST DATA"

D-180: First Julien/Christophe contact on HackTheBox forum
D-120: Start of financial negotiations via ProtonMail
D-60 : Initial payment 5000€ BTC to Christophe
D-30 : Julien's spontaneous application for cybersecurity internship
D-15 : Application validation, selection by... Christophe
D-7  : Complement payment 10000€ BTC to Christophe  
D+0  : Julien's arrival, privilege attribution "by error"
D+1  : First data transfer 156 GB
D+21 : Discovery by Marcus via PAM audit

This revelation changes everything. TechnoServ was not victim of administrative negligence, but of a planned and coordinated infiltration operation. Julien was an infiltrated agent, and Christophe his internal accomplice.

5.3 Post-mortem analysis

Identified failure points:

  1. Faulty HR process: No cross-verification of background
  2. Insufficient task separation: Christophe combined recruitment AND access attribution
  3. Late monitoring: Detection after 21 days instead of real-time
  4. Blind trust: No suspicion faced with excessive privileges “by error”
  5. Security training: Staff not sensitized to social engineering techniques

Final operation cost:

  • Direct damages: €2.3M
  • GDPR sanctions: €450,000
  • Legal and forensic costs: €180,000
  • Estimated client loss: €1.2M
  • Security compliance: €800,000
  • Total: 4.93 million euros

5.4 Strategic lessons

For CIOs:

  1. Absolute zero trust: Even “error” processes must be questioned
  2. Critical task separation: HR, IT and security must be independent
  3. Real-time monitoring: Alerts must be immediate, not weekly
  4. Background verification: Thorough background check for ALL privileged access

For CISOs:

  1. Proactive threat hunting: Look for anomalies instead of waiting for alerts
  2. Multi-source correlation: Cross HR, financial and technical data
  3. Social engineering red team: Regularly test resistance to infiltrations
  4. Security culture: Sensitize to possibility of internal accomplices

✅ Infiltration protection checklist

Prevention (proactive measures):

  • Systematic background check (even interns)
  • Recruitment/access attribution separation
  • Double validation for all admin privileges
  • Real-time behavioral monitoring
  • Anti-social engineering training for HR/IT teams

Detection (continuous surveillance):

  • Automatic alerts for unusual privileges
  • Behavior/personal finance anomaly correlation
  • IT teams external communications surveillance
  • Automated weekly privilege audit
  • Internal honeypots to detect reconnaissance

Response (incident response):

  • Immediate isolation procedure for suspect accounts
  • Automated user activity forensics
  • Authorities notification if criminal suspicion
  • Prepared crisis communication
  • Degraded activity continuity plan

Conclusion: Permanent vigilance as survival imperative

The Julien Dupont affair reveals a disturbing truth: in the modern cybersecurity ecosystem, our worst enemies are no longer just at our doors, they cross the threshold with an access badge and an innocent smile.

The 2024 figures are unequivocal: 71% of organizations are vulnerable to insider threats, with an average cost of $676,517 per incident. But behind these statistics hide more troubling realities: planned infiltrations, internal complicity, and industrial espionage operations that completely escape traditional security radars.

The principle of least privilege is no longer an option, it’s a matter of survival. Every account created, every access granted, every “temporary exception” represents a potential entry point for an adversary who perfectly knows our organizational weaknesses.

PAM architecture, behavioral monitoring, and secure onboarding processes are just tools. The real defense lies in a paradigm shift: moving from default trust to systematic verification, from incident reaction to threat anticipation, from technical security to human security.

Marcus Fontaine learned the hard way that the question is never “What if an intern had access to everything?”, but “What if it wasn’t an accident?

Because in the cybersecurity universe, paranoia is not a flaw, it’s a vital professional skill.

The next time a “motivated intern” works late in your offices, ask yourself the question: is he working for you… or against you?


Resources and sources

Documented real cases

Standards and frameworks

  • Enterprise: CyberArk Privileged Access Security, BeyondTrust Password Safe
  • Mid-Market: Thycotic Secret Server, Centrify Privileged Access Service
  • SMB: Microsoft Privileged Identity Management, HashiCorp Vault
  • Open Source: Apache Guacamole, FreeIPA, Keycloak

Training and certification


Executive summary

Marcus, CIO of TechnoServ, discovers that an intern has had complete Domain Admin privileges for three weeks and has exfiltrated 2.3 TB of sensitive data. The investigation reveals a coordinated infiltration operation: Julien, infiltrated agent, and Christophe, internal accomplice corrupted for €15,000. Total cost: 4.93 million euros. This case perfectly illustrates 2024 statistics: 71% of organizations vulnerable to insider threats, average cost $676,517 per incident (+34% vs 2023). Recommended solutions: strict principle of least privilege, modern PAM architecture, real-time behavioral monitoring, HR/IT task separation, and Zero Trust onboarding processes. The final hook reveals that attribution “errors” can mask planned infiltrations. Key message: permanent vigilance and systematic verification are vital against sophisticated insider threats.


🎯 Quiz: Would you detect an intern like Julien?

S01E04

Could you avoid the infiltration of a fake intern? - HR and IT vigilance test

Question 1/10 Risque critical

A new intern arrives Monday. Christophe from IT tells you: 'I already prepared an account with all access, he can start directly'. Your reaction as responsible CIO?

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Thanks for reading!

What if... an intern had access to everything - S01E04?

Mon Sep 30 2024
3576 words · 26 minutes